Why We Should Be Talking About Bournemouth

Bournemouth are now 10th in the table with 44 points. They have lost four of their last five matches. But why are they important at this time? A word we hear often is the “Guardiola paradigm.” Most clubs want to play positional football—finding a spare man and progressing the ball patiently. But Bournemouth are one of the clubs that dares to play like basketball, often referred to as “rock and roll” football, which differs from Pep Guardiola’s approach.

In a recent interview, Pep Guardiola praised Bournemouth’s playing style. The current Bournemouth boss, Andoni Iraola, has implemented his style. The high-risk, high-reward football has taken shape, with Bournemouth beating top teams like Man City, Newcastle, and Man United.

When I am writing this article, their league position may not be elite, but their underlying numbers show they are heavily underperforming.

The table shows their expected performance and how they differ from the actual performance. 

The expected points table shows that Bournemouth should be 3rd in the Premier League table. 

Game Model and Philosophy
Every coach has a game model that derives from his philosophy and influence. Andoni Iraola discussed his ideas in an interview with Sky Sports on October 19, 2024.

“Especially, I would say, against better opposition. The better the opposition, the more risk you have to take if you want to press them” Andoni Iraola.

High counterattacks per 90 with low PPDA (per pass defensive action).

In his talk, we can interpret that his pressing principle—high risks and high gains—is more about winning the ball higher up the pitch. It’s not only about defending; their volume of attacks also depends heavily on their quick ball recovery numbers.

• Try to recover the ball in the opponent’s half.
• There’s no concern for the opposition’s playing style—no fear, even if the opponent is better on the ball.
• Creative chances depend on the pressing intensity and success.

On-the-Ball Principles

• They use a mix of transitional attacks and possession-based attacking situations.
• Massive verticality, fast progression—attacking the opponent with a hard punch.
• Win the first ball if possible; if not, try to win the second ball with a numerical advantage.
• Long goal kicks bypass the opposition, with an overload on the left side during build-up situations.

Bournemouth’s ball progression with verticality differs from Man City’s dominant style.

In Possession Progress 

1. Progress with Minimum Passes
   Bournemouth are the 4th lowest pass completion side also lowest 5th in possession, Which clarifies that Iraola wants his side to play more risky passes, whether it is complete or not, In September 2023, Bournemouth ranked 4th in the Premier League for the percentage of long goal kicks taken, with 62.5% of their goal kicks being long or sometime after the goalkeeper’s short pass centre backs play long. In the goal kick situation, they use Semenyo as the target man, who can win aerial duals. Kerkez’s overlapping and underlapping according to Semenyo‘s movements and Kluivert makes overloads and pressure to win the second ball and attack the channel space to exploit it.

Bournemouth against Manchester City: Manchester City tried to press 4-4-2. Still, a long direct pass towards Semeyno bypassed the high-pressed 2 lines, which were more suitable because the city was in an open shape.

Another example is in the same match where Bournemouth scored their second goal with the same pattern against Man City (2/11/2024).

The second goal against Man City was in the same match with the same scenario. With an excellent early cross by Kerkez, City was unable to recover the space between goalkeeper and defence.

The interesting thing is that Iraola uses the players’ qualities very well, like Semenyo—his stats show that he wins 2.16 aerial duels per 90, placing him in the 97th percentile among attacking players or midfielders. Kerkez is physically strong and a brilliant depth runner who hurts opponents with his incredible runs. Justin Kluivert uses in the final third using his technical fairness and ability to create chances.

2. Another Way With a Little Bit of Control

Bournemouth overloaded the left side, with one of the pivots dropping beside the left centre-back. This tactic proved effective against teams playing with two centre-forwards. Dropping to the side disrupts the press and opens up new passing lanes.

An example of this can be seen in the match between Chelsea and Bournemouth on January 15, 2025. Tyler Adams dropped beside Huijsen, which made it difficult for Chelsea to press effectively, as the build-up was shifted away from the central zone. With Kerkez inverting, Adams’ movement added further complexity. This created a 2v1 situation for Madueke, where Bournemouth’s wide player Semenyo pinned Caicedo, making it even harder for Chelsea to contain the progression.

Kerkez invented in the midfield and created a new passing lane, creating a 2 vs. 1 situation against Madueke as Hujisen carries the ball.

Bournemouth’s centre-backs—Hüjisen, Senesi, and Zabarnyi—possess the ability to progress the ball through carries under pressure. They contribute to overloads on the left-hand side or execute deep switches to the opposite flank, targeting areas where the opponent is most vulnerable, even in moments when Bournemouth don’t immediately regain possession.

Here, the centre-backs create +1 on the left-hand side by carrying the ball if the opponents shift towards that side, the second option plays a long pass to the opposite side with verticality.

4) Using Team-Mate Understanding on the Left Side

When the opposition sets up in a deep or mid-block against Bournemouth, they respond by overloading the left side. The players operate nearby, which not only allows for quick combinations but also enables immediate counter-pressing (regain) if possession is lost. This forces the opponent to stay pinned to that side.

A great example of this was Bournemouth’s goal against Newcastle in their win on January 18, 2025. They created an overload against Newcastle 5-4-1, and Semenyo’s double movement opened up the channel. An intelligent cut-back followed, which Kluivert converted for the opening goal of the match.

Created a 5 vs 2 situation on the left and Semenyo’s double movements opened the channel space, which was finished by Kluivert

Another situation against Chelsea match where Chelsea dropped deep with a 6-2-2 shape. 

Out of Possession 

Bournemouth is excellent and robust in their pressing. They are the first side with the highest turnover of 314 in 40% length of the opposition’s half. They have had 60 moves turn into shots, which is the most exciting about the game model when one can compare it to Klopp’s “heavy metal” pressing in the Borussia Dortmund era. Pressing is the playmaker for Bournemouth. 

When the opposition goalkeeper has the ball and looks to build from the back, Bournemouth initiates their press in a 4-4-2 diamond shape. The primary objective is to block access to one side and force the play from inside to outside. Initially, the wide forwards stay narrow to protect the half-spaces. Once Bournemouth identifies which side the opponent commits to, they shift into a man-to-man pressing structure on that side.

4-4-2  shape, the initial start of pressing, both wide forwards try to protect the half-space.

Once Bournemouth successfully cuts the passing lane and confirms that the opponent is building down the right side, they shift their press accordingly. This allows them to gain an advantage by using the touchline as an extra defender, effectively “sandwiching” the opponent. The press becomes tighter, with the sideline acting as a constraint, reducing the opponent’s options and increasing the chance of a turnover.

Ryan Christie is an excellent player in pressing, intelligent and scans all the time and also covers the exact time when required. We can see in the Tottenham game how he scanned and intercepted the ball and launched a counterattack.

If an opposition player manages to lose their marker and becomes free on the pressing side, Bournemouth’s centre-backs or far-side defenders don’t hesitate to step out and squeeze the space. This helps maintain compactness and control even when they’re outnumbered. A good example is from the match against Tottenham when right-back Pedro Porro lost his marker and made a run into the channel. Huijsen responded by shifting across to the left, covering both the central area and the far side, ensuring Bournemouth didn’t lose defensive structure despite the numerical disadvantage.

Set Piece 

While Andoni Iraola often embraces chaos in open play, Bournemouth occasionally shows control in set pieces—particularly through a structured short corner routine that can be described as a “give-and-go” corner. This involves a quick pass and immediate return to the original taker, creating a moment of separation and disrupting the defensive setup. A great example of this was their goal against Brentford(9.12.2024), which came directly from executing this type of short-corner routine.

Give and go between (Cook and Kluivert) in the corner, how they used numerical advantage with the modern corner, and Kerkez pinned Pinnock(5), providing space for Kluivert to shoot. 

Problems

Bournemouth have conceded more goals in the second half than in the first, and they’ve also kept more clean sheets in the first half. This pattern suggests that as the game progresses, their pressing structure becomes more vulnerable—possibly due to physical drop-off, loss of compactness, or lack of depth from injuries sustained throughout the season.

This mirrors a similar issue seen with Marcelo Bielsa’s Leeds United, who also believed in controlling the game through off-the-ball intensity rather than possession. Over time, such systems can expose teams to fatigue and positional breakdowns, especially when injuries pile up or squad depth is limited.

Tactical Problems in Deep Block 

Against a team like Brighton, who thrive on press-baiting, Bournemouth used a man-to-man plus one (+1) approach in their third when defending the last line. As a result, the game effectively became 10 vs 9 in Brighton’s favour. Bournemouth responded by using pressing triggers to block all passing lanes. However, Brighton’s defensive midfielder dropped into the last line, while their forwards and full-backs pushed higher, pinning Bournemouth’s last defensive line. This created vertical separation within Bournemouth’s shape, often leaving Zone 14—the golden zone—open to be exploited.

Brighton created a 5 vs 4 in the last line against Bournemouth, as Minteh pinned Huijsen and Pedro pinned Hill, giving the space for Zone 14 for utter exploitation. Which may be a problem for them when they defend their half with too much aggressiveness.

We have enjoyed the vision of Iraola and hope for another paradigm shift in football in the near future.

Written by APFA member, Sourabh Banerjee